Introduction
The twentieth century has seen a dramatic shift in the law regarding the relationship between parents and children, both internationally and nationally. Whereas in the past the emphasis was on the rights and powers of parents (parental authority), the emphasis has moved towards a child-centred approach with the interest of children at the forefront. 1 Today parental authority is concerned more with parental responsibilities and duties, which should be exercised in the interest of children, rather than with parental rights and powers. 2 Internationally the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child 3 has set the stage for the enhancement of children's rights with the recognition of children as individuals worthy of protection in their own right. Nationally the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa, the ratification of the CRC and a recently-enacted Children's Act 4 have also given new meaning to the protection and the rights of children. 5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, containing a comprehensive Bill of Rights, specifically protects and advances the rights of children in that it recognises that children, as a vulnerable group within society, have specific and unique interests different from those of adults, and that these interests deserve special and separate protection.
With the recognition of children as the holders of fundamental rights comes the possibility of conflict with the rights of other holders of human rights. This is possible especially within the family context, where different fundamental rights can come into conflict with one another, for instance between the parents' right to religious freedom and their children's rights to life and human dignity. 6 This requires a weighing or balancing act to determine which right must take preference. This balancing of interests often creates tension, which can have serious negative implications for those involved within the family context. The focus of this article is specifically directed at such a conflict of rights within the family unit between parents and their child.
In a recent ground-breaking case the South African courts were requested for the first time to use their discretion to interfere in the parent-child relationship, due to the traditional socio-cultural beliefs of the parents. 7 In what has been described as "every parent's nightmare; the fancy of many teenagers", a 16 year-old schoolgirl from Milnerton in the Western Cape asked to be "freed" from her parents to live semi-independently from them because of her unhappiness with the conservative manner in which her parents treated her. According to reports her parents come from a very conservative sector of South African society and kept her under constant supervision, barred her from talking to boys, communicating with friends on her cellular phone, reading what she likes (her parents find Harry Potter inappropriate) or even going out with friends after school.
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After considering the matter the judge assigned to the case granted her request to live semi-independently with a school friend and her family (called by the judge the host family) until she reaches the age of 18 (her majority). Her parents may have contact with her for two to three hours a week at a neutral venue and may phone her between 8:00 and 8:30 pm on a Tuesday and Friday. Holidays are to be shared between the host family and her parents, the first of which was to be taken with the 6 Bekink 2003 THRHR 246. 7 Own emphasis added.
Legalbrief TODAY, 10 June 2010 available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story= 20100610091458403 accessed on 15 June 2010. The said case was not reported, as only a declaratory order was handed down. Despite attempts by the author hereof to obtain copies of the legal arguments presented in court and the order given, the author was unable to obtain such documentation from the learned judge or the attorneys representing the girl. The reasons given were the sensitivity of the matter and the client's instructions. Reliance is therefore made on the media reports of the matter.
host family. Despite the fact that she will no longer be residing with her parents, they retain their responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of their child. It is the aim of this contribution primarily to focus on the key questions mentioned above. They will be discussed not only from a South African point of view but also by taking into account regional and international conventions and legal requirements.
Possible solutions for striking a balance between the rights of children and of parents will also be explored. Before these questions are explored a brief historical overview is provided of the development of parental responsibilities and rights in South Africa.
2
The historical development of parental responsibilities and rights
Introduction
In general the development of parental responsibilities and rights can be divided into two distinct eras. The first is the era before 1994 and the second refers to the era after 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) came into power. 
The pre 1994 disposition
Historically the relationship between parents and children in South Africa is one of parental authority or power and illustrates a distinctly paternalistic bias. Children simply had to respect the control and authority of their parents, because it was accepted that parents knew what was best for their children. 13 From the common law point of view the relationship between parent and child expressed itself primarily in the parental power over a minor child and in the mutual duty of support between parent and child. 14 This also included the right of parents to demand obedience from their children and to punish them in a reasonable and moderate manner. 15 The concept of parental authority thus entailed that parents had complete control over their children. This was, however, subject to the inherent authority of the High Court as the upper guardian to intervene in matters relating to parental authority. During the preconstitutional period the High Court exercised this authority sparingly and only when required to do so. 16 Initially the court protected the sanctity of parental authority, as a good cause for intervention had to be shown. 17 This can be illustrated by the fact that it was initially held that special grounds, which inter alia included danger to a child's life, health, or morals had to be present before a court would exercise its discretion of interference. 18 The court later followed a more lenient approach that allowed for some interference in family life. In Short v Naisby the court held that each case had to be considered on its own merits, with the paramount consideration being whether the interest of the child demanded such interference. 19 The emphasis was thus shifted from "special grounds" to that of "the interest of the child". 20 The court in S v L 21 added that although it has a right as the upper guardian to interfere in family life the right was not limitless but should be exercised where the parents were unable to properly perform their duties themselves. The court also pointed out that it would not interfere with a parent's decision simply because it did not agree with the parents' decision. 22 Despite applying the principle of "the interests of the child" the preconstitutional period of South African family law still tended to lean towards minimal state intervention. 23 Children were still not seen as members of a family with individual rights. This contributed inter alia to the vagueness of the concept of the "interest of the child" and the accepted viewpoint at the time that the integrity of the family and the autonomy of parents to raise their children as they saw fit should be respected.
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The parent-child relationship underwent a dramatic change, however, with the enactment of the Constitution and the recognition of children's rights in the The right to equality is guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution. Section 9(1) guarantees everyone the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Sections 9(3) and 9(4) prohibit unfair discrimination by the state and by private entities on a non-exclusive list of grounds. 37 One of the grounds listed on which unfair discrimination is prohibited is age. Any discrimination between some children and others will thus be subject to scrutiny to determine if it complies with the prohibition on unfair discrimination. The Milnerton case also serves as an illustration of the aforementioned acceptance of children's rights to autonomy. According to media reports the girl's parents suggested a boarding school as a solution to their current situation. The girl's request, however, not to be sent to a boarding school but to reside with a host family was granted by the judge assigned to the case. 48 This suggests that the court found the girl (aged 16) of sufficient intellectual, psychological and emotional maturity to express an autonomous opinion on her future.
Children's specific rights: section 28
In recognition of children's vulnerability section 28(1) provides a range of rights which provide extra protection to children in certain areas, such as the right to a name and nationality, family or parental care, or appropriate alternative care when removed from the family. Section 28(2) provides further protection by stating that a child's interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
With due regard to the underlying theme of this article, section 28 (1)(b) and (c) respectively affords every child the right to family or parental care, appropriate alternative care if removed from the family environment, and the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.
Section 28(1)(b) has three purposes. Firstly, it is aimed at the preservation of a healthy parent-child relationship and imposes an obligation on the state to respect existing family or parental care by limiting any interference to situations where it is justified. 49 It should be noted that it does so from a child-centred approach rather than a parent's perspective, as it is the right of the child that is at stake. where a child has been removed from the family, the state has a duty to provide alternative care. The fact that section 28(1)(b) has horizontal application between the parent and the child has a further implication in that South African law recognises that children can enforce fundamental rights against their parents. This undoubtedly raises the potential for conflict between the rights and interest of the parents and the rights and interest of the child, and the courts will have the task of balancing or weighing these competing rights. Thirdly, section 28(1) requires that care of a certain quality be provided.
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The particular recognition given in section 28 (1) "Abuse" in relation to a child means "any form of harm or ill-treatment deliberately inflicted on a child, and includes-(a) assaulting a child or inflicting any other form of deliberate injury on a child; (b) sexually abusing a child or allowing a child to be sexually abused; (c) bullying by another child; (d) a labour practice that exploits a child; or (e) exposing or subjecting a child to behaviour that may harm the child psychologically or emotionally".
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"Neglect" in relation to a child means a failure in the exercise of parental responsibilities to provide for the child's basic physical, intellectual, emotional or social needs. In Pillay
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, Langa CJ remarked that the need for a child's voice to be heard is perhaps even more acute when it concerns children who should be increasingly taking responsibilities for their own actions and beliefs (in this case a 16 year-old girl). The court's stance on "substantial injustice" is also of particular significance as it indicated that it referred to civil proceedings that are of crucial importance to a child's current life and future developments. 74 The Children's Act confirms this approach in that a child's views must be given due weight in accordance with his or her age, In the scenario given on page 2 of the 16 year old Milnerton girl, this therefore does not mean that the child's interest are of such importance that the cohesion of the family becomes unimportant, but should also be a factor to be considered by the court before taking a decision to grant the girl her wish to live semi-independently.
The paramount principle does, however, require a truly child-centred approach, The focus of this contribution is, however, on the clarification of the factors in the Children's Act that are to be considered in an application for the termination, suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights in the best interest of the child. In this regard sections 7 and 28 of the Children's Act are of particular importance. They will be discussed in reverse order.
Section 28 of the Children's Act in particular deals with the court-ordered termination, extension, suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights and states as follows:
(1) A person referred to in subsection (3) may apply to the High Court, a divorce court in a divorce matter or a children's court for an order-(a) suspending for a period, or terminating, any or all of the parental responsibilities and rights which a specific person has in respect of a child; or Section 28(1) authorises the suspension for a period or the termination of any or all of the parental responsibilities and rights a specific person has. While the first of these scenarios is extremely extensive ("termination of any or all") and should thus be used sparingly and with due consideration, the second is less restrictive in that it specifically states that such suspension of parental responsibilities and rights is for a specific period only and can therefore not operate indefinitely. 94 Applications for extending parental responsibilities and rights may be granted as well as applications to circumscribe (to limit or define) such rights. The aforementioned applications may be combined with an application for care and contact in terms of section 23. This entails that an application to terminate or suspend parental rights and responsibilities may be combined with an application to assign care and contact to another person.
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The applicants who might possibly bring such an application include a co-holder of parental responsibilities and rights; any other person having a sufficient interest in the care, protection, wellbeing or development of the child; the child 96 himself or herself acting with leave of the court; any other person who has an interest in the child, acting with leave of the court; or a family advocate or the representative of any 94 Heaton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 3-23.
I assume that this was the case with the 16 year-old Milnerton girl.
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This grants further recognition of a child's right to participation in matters concerning that child.
interested organ of state. It is noteworthy that social development authorities can also bring an application of the kind envisaged in section 28.
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When considering such an application the court must take the following factors into account: the best interests of the child; the relationship between the child and the person whose parental responsibilities and rights are being challenged; the degree of commitment that the person has shown towards the child; and any other factor that should in the opinion of the court be taken into account. 98 With reference to the topic under discussion "any other factor" may include the cultural, social and religious circumstances, interests and needs of the individual child as well as the child's specific wishes.
It is without doubt no coincidence that the requirement of the best interest is one of the factors that has to be considered by a court when exercising its discretion, as the standard has been described as the golden thread that runs through the whole fabric of the South African law relating to children. 99 The concept of "the best interests of the child" has, however, been widely criticised for its vagueness and parents towards the child; the capacity of the parents to provide for the (emotional and intellectual) needs of the child; the likely effect of any change in the child's circumstances; the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents; the need for the child to remain in the care of and to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or tradition; the child' age, maturity, developmental stage, gender, background and any other relevant characteristics of the child; the child's physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development; any disability or any chronic illness that a child may have or may suffer from; the need for a child to be brought up within a stable (or nearly stable family environment; the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm; and the taking of actions or decisions that would minimise the exposure of a child to legal or administrative proceedings.
When evaluating the Act's list of fourteen factors two issues present themselves as being of concern. Firstly, although the act emphasises the needs of the child and his or her physical and emotional security, a child's preferences are excluded from the list. It can, however, perhaps be argued that this is catered for in section 10 of the Children's Act, which specifically allows for child participation in court proceedings. considered to be relevant. This may be a limitation in practice, although judicial officers have the discretion to consider other factors where relevant. 105 The inclusion of "any other factor that should, in the opinion of the court be taken into account" in section 28(4)(d) of the Children's Act eliminates this problem for the application of section 28 at least. In addition it should be noted that although the fourteen factors
give particular recognition to the well-being of the child, emphasis is also placed on the importance of the need for a child to remain in the care of and to maintain a connection with his or her parents, family and extended family, culture or tradition. A stable family environment should thus be protected where possible. Skelton and Proudlock "Interpretation, Objects, Application and Implementation" 2-8.
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In B v S 1995 3 SA 571 (A) the court held at 572 that an application for the variation of an existing access order really involves a judicial investigation into a child's best interest and may even allow a court to call evidence mero motu. The court should also if necessary call oral evidence from the parties themselves to enable it to form its own opinion.
Finally, an evaluation of the topic under discussion would not be complete without taking account of regional and international standards. A brief analysis of the most important international and regional instruments will thus be given.
The influence of international and regional law
In terms of section 39 (1) of the UDHR no one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family and home. Special recognition is also afforded to mothers and children in terms of article 25 in that they are entitled to "special care
and assistance". The UDHR's provisions also include the right to freedom of religion, thought and conscience and the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community. 107 Other associated rights include inter alia the right to equality and dignity. act in his or her best interest the state has to intervene and may even separate the child from his or her family.
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The CRC also recognises that children generally can play a more active role in decision-making within the family life. Article 12 specifically recognises that children are individuals in their own right and should be afforded the opportunity to express their own views in matters affecting them. These views should be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
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Finally the CRC also recognises the rights to freedom of expression "at all times" have to be reconciled with a child's right to freedom of expression, association and thought, and ultimately the best interests of the child, which shall be the primary consideration.
Conclusion
The significance of the family as the natural unit and basis for society and the importance of children growing up in a stable family environment where strong psychological bonds between family members can be formed can hardly be overemphasised. 137 This idealism, contained in international and regional legal instruments, is mirrored in the Constitution and Children's Act of South Africa.
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These documents, however, also recognise that although children are part of the family unit they are at the same time bearers of individual rights. The possibility of potential conflict between the interests of children and adults is thus also foreseen.
Despite the sanctity of the family unit this does not mean that families are above public scrutiny. It can generally be accepted that situations may arise where the welfare of the child may demand that the child be deprived of the opportunity to maintain an established relationship, for instance where a child has been abused by parents.
When confronted with problematic situations and balancing or weighing competing rights and interests concerning children the best interests principle is still the most important factor to be taken into account. 139 The best interests principle, the founding principle of children's rights, however, is anchored in the family 140 and any break between the child and the family should be carefully considered. In an attempt to resolve disputes between parents and their children, the relevant provisions of the Constitution and Children's Act must be carefully considered and must be balanced and tested in relation to each other for constitutional consistency and compliance. individualised examination of the precise real-life situation of the child involved.
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The child's views should also be heard and given respectful and careful consideration as children's interests do not always correlate with those of their parents. 143 The focus should thus be on the impact that the socio-cultural beliefs and practices of the parents have on the specific child. This should be considered only if it can be shown by reliable means to impact negatively on the development and happiness of the child concerned.
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The relationship between parents and their children is a very personal and sometimes fragile one. This domain forms part of the world of morality and not even the state should interfere in this inner sanctity unless the parents' conduct towards the child is harmful, abusive or amounts to unlawfulness. When the conduct is not in the best interests of the child or contravenes any other of the rights afforded to the child in the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the Republic, such conduct is inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution and thus invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. 145 A court adjudicating such a matter must declare such inconsistency to be invalid and may make an order that is just and equitable. 146 Such an order may include the removal of a child from his or her family environment. 147 Possible less restrictive solutions should, however, at least also be considered.
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The fact that disagreement is part of life and occurs even in a healthy, normal family relationship should not be left out of the equation. Children and parents will disagree on certain "family rules". When parents are acting within the boundaries of the law, even though they are conservative, and their actions do not reflect any abuse or neglect, their responsibilities and rights will take preference above the rights of their children, for without this recognition the value of the family unit as the natural and fundamental unit of society will not be recognised. In the scenario given on page 2 of the 16 year-old Milnerton girl, one may argue that the order given is quite extreme, as very restricted contact between the child and her parents is allowed. Unfortunately information on the case is very restricted, as explained in note 8. The only alternative to the removal of the child that was considered but rejected by the child was the possibility of a boarding school, according to news reports.
personal preferences in their upbringing cannot alone and should not tip the scales of justice in their favour. Caution should be taken in the interpretation of the legislative framework not to encourage children to break the parent-child relationship on a mere whim, as an overemphasis of children's rights may result in the destruction of the family.
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It should also be remembered that although the best interests principle is still the most important factor to be taken into account when balancing competing rights regarding children, this right can be considered as a temporary right which exists to protect the child during his or her vulnerable stages. This right ends when a child reaches 18 years of age. The relationship between parents and a child, however,
does not end when a child reaches adulthood. It is therefore suggested that the principle of the best interests of the child should be extended into the principle of the best interests of the person (although the latter principle is not an enforceable right under the Constitution). 150 This entails that the important relationship between parents and their child is continued on an ongoing basis to the benefit of all of those involved in the family relationship. The long-term effect of the break in the parentchild relationship should thus also be considered, for a break now may have serious detrimental consequences for the future relationship not only between the parent and the child but also in future between grandparents and their grandchildren. The family should therefore be kept intact, if that is at all possible.
To conclude, the task of deciding what is in the best interests of the child is a very arduous and complex one and more often than not requires the Wisdom of Solomon.
Any care or maintenance order made by a court is in itself an act of clairvoyance. No one can predict the future; hence the caution. Every effort should therefore be made by all of those involved to jealously search for the best interests of the child.
It is therefore argued that line with s 150 of the Children's Act the situation should be of a serious nature before the removal of a child is considered.
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For example, a parent's duty of support towards his or her 19 year-old "child" may continue if the "child"
is not yet self-supporting and if such a duty is found to be in the best interest of the "child".
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